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Abstract
This paper analyzes the optimality of policy specications used to regulate the acquisition and
operation of local rms by multinational enterprises(MNE). We emphasize the consequence of such
regulation on the price of the domestic rm in the market for corporate control. We show that it is
optimal to impose ceilings on foreign ownership of domestic rms when the government's objective
is to maximize domestic shareholder prots. While the optimal ceiling is high enough for the MNE
to gain control of the domestic rm, it nevertheless inuences the price that the MNE must pay for
the domestic rm's shares to the advantage of the domestic shareholders. Restrictions on transfer
pricing are either irrelevant or strictly suboptimal. The consequences of alternative specications
of the government's objective function are also analyzed.
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Both in the developed and developing world, foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational
enterprises (MNEs) has grown signicantly in recent years.1 One of the ways in which an
MNE enters the domestic market in a host country is by acquiring a domestic rm (DF).
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions in developing countries are on the rise and constitute
about a third of the total FDI inows in value terms (Norb ack and Persson, 2007).2 Such
acquisitions are motivated by the possibility of signicant benets that may accrue to the
MNE if it gains control of the DF.3 These benets of control may be a result of several
dierent sources. For example, there may be a pre-existing vertical relationship between
the MNE and the DF which is governed by a contract. It is well known that such arm's-
length trading may give rise to ineciencies stemming from asymmetries of information, or
from the diculty of including quality specications in an enforceable contract.4 Vertical
integration, resulting from acquisition, could lead to the elimination of these ineciencies,
thus producing corresponding benets. Alternatively, the DF may form an important node
in an elaborate network of inputs, outputs, and markets for the MNE, and the MNE might
not be able to take advantage of this link unless it has full control over the DF (as opposed
to, for example, being merely an input supplier to the DF). These benets, after the MNE
acquires the DF, may of course accrue either to the subsidiary or to the parent.
Although such benets correspond to gains in eciency following integration, most LDC
governments impose substantial restrictions on the acquisition of domestic rms by MNEs.
These restrictions resulted, presumably, from the feeling that while the foreign owners of the
MNE gain from such acquisitions, there are no corresponding benets owing to the erstwhile
domestic owners. On the other hand, loss of domestic control over the operations of the rm
may lead to outcomes inconsistent with the objectives of domestic policy. For example the
MNE, once in control of the DF, may evade taxes in the host country by engaging in transfer
1See sections 1.1-1.3 in Chapter 1 of Markusen (2002) for an overview of FDI inows in recent years.
2In the developed countries, more than half of the foreign company investment is in the form of mergers
and acquisitions. See Horn and Persson (2001).
3The issue of \control" is discussed more fully in Section 2.
4See, for example, Williamson (1975) and Ethier (1986).
1pricing.5
In this paper, we present a dierent rationale for policies restricting the acquisition
of domestic rms by foreign owners. When acquisitions are motivated by the existence
of potential benets, we show that policy can be designed so that the original domestic
shareholders (DSH) of the acquired rm also obtain a share of the benets. The optimal
policy response is to impose a ceiling on the equity participation by the MNE on the DF.
We show that while the optimal ceiling is high enough for the MNE to gain control of the
DF, it nevertheless inuences the price that the MNE must pay for the DF's shares, to the
advantage of the DSH.
Restrictions on foreign ownership are the most obvious barriers for FDI and have been in
eect in several countries (Golub, 2003). In India until mid-1990's, for projects which are not
wholly export-oriented, the normal ceiling on foreign equity was 40%, 74% when advanced
technology is involved. Similar restrictions have been in place in some other countries,
including Mexico which requires majority domestic ownership in all foreign ventures, and
Nigeria which restricts foreign ownership to either 40% or 60% (Svejnar and Smith, 1984).6
While China has opened up to trade, it still has several restrictions on foreign ownership. To
a lesser degree, such ownership restrictions are also prevalent in a number of OECD countries.
Majority domestic ownership is required in the airlines industry in the European Union and
North American countries, in the telecommunications industry in Japan, and in the coastal
and freshwater shipping industry in the United States (Golub, 2003). In Canada, foreign
ownership restrictions are in place in a variety of sectors including telecommumications,
transportation, and the nancial services sector (Globerman, 1999). In Australia, since the
privatization of Qantas, the major airline, a special federal act has ensured that Qantas
5If the MNE supplies an input to a foreign subsidiary, and the subsidiary's host country taxes prots at
a rate higher than the country of the parent company, then it is advantageous for the MNE to price the
input above its production cost, and thus avoid prot taxes in the host country. This practice is known
as transfer pricing. See Svejnar and Smith (1984) for a full elaboration of this argument. For an analysis
of optimal transfer pricing regulations by a domestic government under asymmetric information about the
MNE's production cost, see Prusa (1990).
6While it may seem that some of these ceilings (e.g. those set below 50%) are designed to prevent foreign
ownership of a domestic rm, we explain in section 2 below that such ceilings are not necessarily inconsistent
with foreign control.
2remains majority Australian-owned.
An interesting implication of our analysis is that if the government's only objective is to
maximize the gains of the DSH, and if the ceiling on foreign ownership is set optimally, then
the possibility of transfer pricing is not of concern to the government. Specically, we show
that, in this case, restrictions on transfer pricing are either irrelevant or strictly suboptimal.
Of course, the government may still lose tax revenue if transfer pricing is allowed. However,
if the government's objective is to maximize the sum of tax revenues and DSH prots, or
a weighted sum of the two, and the weight assigned to tax revenues is not too high, then
restrictions on transfer pricing are still either irrelevant or suboptimal.
Markusen (1995, 2002) provides an excellent survey of the theoretical literature on FDI
and multinational rms. In terms of mergers and acquisitions, the particular kind of FDI
that considered here, there is a small but growing literature that examines the welfare impact
of mergers and the role of competition policies in an international context (see, for example,
Barros and Cabral, 1994; Head and Ries, 1997; Horn and Levinsohn, 2001). More recent work
on cross-border mergers examines the endogenous formation of mergers (Horn and Persson,
2001; Lommerud, Straume and Sorgard, 2006) where both national as well as international
mergers are allowed. Although the modeling of product market competition is richer in these
papers, none of them are concerned with the issue of control.
Falvey and Fried (1986) argue that restrictions on foreign ownership may be optimal
because, in order to gain the necessary domestic equity participation, the MNE would be
forced to show a level of prots acceptable to domestic investors. This may limit the extent
of transfer pricing by the MNE. However, this argument assumes that the MNE is able to
precommit to a level of prot for the domestic shareholders. In the treatment below, we do
not assume such precommitment. Gangopadhyay and Gang (1995) focuses on the issue of
domestic versus foreign control. They show that the domestic government's tax revenues are
maximized when control of the DF vests with the MNE, as opposed to the case where the
DF is domestically owned and transactions with the MNE are at arm's-length by contractual
arrangement. Thus the issue of ownership restrictions is also important for their analysis.
Without such restrictions, the MNE can completely move its prots away through transfer
pricing and thus avoid paying domestic taxes.
In a recent paper, Norb ack and Persson (2007) compare two policies concerning invest-
3ment liberalization: (i) allowing greeneld investments as well as mergers and acquisitions
or (ii) allowing greeneld FDI only. It might seem that allowing greeneld FDI only might
be better as it is unlikely to reduce market concentration. However, the authors show that
prohibiting mergers and acquisitions might be counterproductive. For example, if the do-
mestic rm holds a scarce asset, competitive bidding among MNEs might fetch a high rent
for the domestic rm, provided there is sucient complementarity between the assets of the
domestic rm and the MNEs. Thus, by ruling out mergers and acquisitions, the govern-
ment may inadvertently lower domestic welfare.7 Mattoo, Olarreaga, and Saggi (2004) have
shown that in the presence of costly technology transfer, direct entry by foreign rms (i.e.,
greeneld FDI) might lower domestic welfare, and, in fact the host country's government
might prefer acquisition by foreign rms to greeneld FDI.
Our paper is related to this body of work. However, the underlying mechanism is quite
dierent. In our framework, there is only one MNE. Hence, unlike in Norb ack and Persson
(2008), competitive bidding does not arise. Central to our analysis is government policy.
The government chooses the minimal level of prots and places a ceiling on the fraction of
the domestic rm that foreign rms can own. At the optimum, the ceiling should not be so
low that the MNE cannot exercise control. However, having no ceiling at all is not optimal
either.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is outlined in Section
2. Section 3 considers the case where the objective of the government is to maximize the
prot of the domestic shareholders. In Section 4 we examine the consequences of a dierent
objective function for the government|maximizing the sum (more generally, a weighted
sum) of domestic shareholders' prots and tax revenue. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
There are two periods, 0 and 1, indexed by t, and three agents: a domestic rm (DF), a
multinational (MNE), and the domestic government. The control of the rm at time 0 lies
with domestic shareholders (DSH).
7See Norb ack and Persson (2008) for endogenous determination of acquisition price, acquisition pattern,
and greeneld investments in an oligopoly setting.
4The issue of control needs some elaboration. By control, we mean decision-making au-
thority over important aspects of a rm's operation, e.g. production, pricing, and marketing.
In the formal model, we equate control with the ownership of a certain fraction of the rm's
equity. However, it may be worth pointing out that the fraction necessary for control may
vary widely in dierent cases. As Buckley (1985) notes, \ a foreign investor holding 30% of
voting equity in a company where no other investor holds more than 10% is more likely to be
able to exercise control....than if he held 49%, with the other 51% in one person's...hands."
Thus a ceiling of, say, 40% may not be incompatible with foreign control. It is also important
to note that in some developing countries, a signicant share of stocks is often owned by
public sector nancial institutions, which do not play any active role in the operation of the
rm. This further reduces the ownership requirement for control.
Our analysis centers around the conditions under which the MNE may want to take over
the DF, and the terms of such a transfer of control. The rationale behind a (potential)
takeover is that the MNE may obtain some additional benets (as discussed in Section 1) if
it gains control of the DF.
Let D be the net maximum prot generated by the DF when under DSH control. Once
the MNE acquires the DF, the latter may show lower prots because the MNE engages in
transfer pricing, for example, by charging articially high prices for some input which the
parent rm may supply to the DF. This results in a gain for the MNE shareholders (who are
now in control) at the expense of any remaining domestic shareholders. MNE shareholders
may also gain at the expense of the domestic government, since the MNE avoids paying
domestic prot taxes by showing lower prots.
The domestic government can regulate the extent of transfer pricing in various ways.
Common methods used in LDCs include ceilings on the royalty payments which the DF
makes to the parent rm, ceilings on the prices for inputs which the MNE charges the
DF, and the imposition of indirect taxes on imported inputs (Chudson, 1985). In eect,
these regulations imply a minimum level of prots   which the DF must show when under
MNE control. We will accordingly treat   as a policy variable for the domestic government,
indicating the extent to which the government limits transfer pricing.
At t = 0, the government announces its policy, which consists of the variable   as
discussed above, and a ceiling on the fraction of the domestic rm that can be under foreign
5ownership. We denote this ceiling by .
At time t = 1, the MNE learns about the potential benets b which will result from
acquisition or control. b is assumed to be a random variable drawn from a distribution F(b),
with support [0; b]. This distribution is known to the government at t = 0. After learning
the realized value of b, the MNE decides whether to bid for control. If it does so decide,
then at t = 1 it makes an oer to the DSH for some fraction of its shares, to which the DSH
respond by tendering part or all of the shares.
We make the following assumptions about the acquisition process:
Assumption 1 In order to obtain a controlling interest, a party must own strictly more
than some fraction  of the DF's shares. We shall assume  to be exogenously given. (A
simple majority rule corresponds to a  = 1
2).
Assumption 2 All the shares of the DF are initially under the ownership of a single share-
holder. (However, all our results go through if there is a `pivotal' shareholder who owns at
least 1    of the DF's shares.)
Assumption 3 The MNE can make only unconditional price oers for the DF's shares.
(i.e. it must announce a single price P per 100% of the DF's equity, and it may announce
a fraction  of the equity it wants to buy. However, it must buy any quantity less than  if
that is all that is tendered.)
To evaluate the optimality of government policy, we need to specify an objective function
for the government. We shall examine the consequences of the following alternative assump-
tions.
W1 The government's objective is to maximize the domestic shareholder's prots.8
W2 The government maximizes the sum of DSH prots and its own tax revenue.
W3 The government maximizes a weighted sum of DSH prots and tax revenues.
Obviously, W1 and W2 are special cases of W3, but it is instructive to consider the
special cases separately.
8If we assume that domestic prots are reinvested, then we can also justify this assumption by appealing to
the fact that many LDCs are capital-scarce, and maximizing investment is a high priority for the government.
63 Maximizing Shareholder Prots
In this section, we assume that the government's objective function is given by W1, and that
the prot tax rate is zero. We are interested in nding the government's optimal choice of
policy parameters   and . We do this by using the following sequential procedure: rst
nd the optimal response of the DSH (who has the last move) to a given price oer by the
MNE and a policy choice for the government, then isolate the optimal price oer by the
MNE under a given policy, and nally deduce the optimal policy choice for the government.
Let  ,  be the government's choice of policy parameters. Let P be the price oered
per 100% of the equity by the MNE, and let  denote the fraction of equity it oers to buy.
Clearly   . The DSH can sell any fraction 0   since the price oer is unconditional by
Assumption 3. We will characterize an oer by the pair (P;). Dene
  
b + D    
b
 + D    
and for  2 (;1], dene
P() 
(1   )D   (1   ) 
   
:
Lemma 1 Suppose   < D. Then,




> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if P < D
 if D  P < P()
 if P  P()
(b) The MNE will oer (P;) = (P();) if    , and will make no oer otherwise.
Proof: See Appendix. 2
To see the intuition behind Lemma 1, rst note that if the DSH retains control of the
DF, it can obtain prots at the rate of D on any shares it holds in the rm. Thus, to sell
any shares at all, the DSH must be oered a price which is at least D. At P = D, the DSH
is indierent between retaining all shares and selling up to  (recall that the DSH must sell
0 >  to transfer control to the MNE). At P > D, the DSH clearly prefers selling at least
, and can thus obtain a net prot of (P  D) while still maintaining control. The decision
7regarding whether to hand over control to the MNE or not is thus based upon prots or
losses with respect to the remaining fraction (1   ) of shares. Suppose the DSH transfers
control by selling another (0   ). Since the DF will show operating prots of   < D, it
follows that the DSH will realize capital losses to the amount (1  0)(D    ) of the shares
the DSH retains. Thus the DSH's capital gain on the (0  ) must outweight this loss, i.e.,
in order to transfer control, we must have
(
0   )(P   
D)  (1   
0)(
D    ):
Since 0 >  and D >  , it follows that P > D >  . But then the DSH will sell as much
as it can, i.e. upto , since any retained shares yield only   < P.
If the MNE is bidding for control, then it will clearly set P at the smallest value which
satises the above condition, in which case the condition is satised with equality. Let P()
denote this price. This yields
(   )P() + (1   )  = (1   )
D
which implies
P() = [(1   )
D   (1   ) ]=(   ): (1)
Thus the total prot realized by the DSH is
P() + (1   )  = P() + (1   )
D
= (P()   
D) + 
D:
That is the net capital gain realized, over and above the initial market value of the DF, is,
() = (P()   
D):
Consider the premium () = P() D. This is calculated so that the DSH realizes exactly
as much capital gain on the last (   ) shares sold, as is needed to compensate it for the
capital loss (D    ) on the (1   ) shares it retains. Since the MNE is restricted to an
unconditional single-price oer, it must oer P() on the entire fraction of shares it buys.
Hence the DSH realizes a `free-rider' capital gain on the rst  as well.
Now consider the MNE. It is correspondingly forced to pay a premium () for control
of the rm. This premium is minimized at  = , since P() is decreasing in . However,
8the MNE obtains an additional benet of b if it assumes control. Thus it will assume control
if and only if b  (). Substituting for (), we obtain
b  [







D    )(1   )]
) b   b  (
D    )   (





D    ]  [b + 
D    ]
)  
b + D    
b
 + D    
  
as the condition under which the MNE will assume control.
Note that the premium is paid to compensate the DSH for the capital loss it will suer
as a result of the transfer of control. This loss occurs because   is set below D, i.e., some
transfer pricing is permitted. This leads directly to the conclusion that
Lemma 2 Suppose   > D. If   1, then
(a) The MNE will oer (P;), where P =
D (1 ) 
 +  < D and  =  + 1.
(b) The DSH will tender  and get D = D + 2,
where , 1, and 2 are positive and arbitrarily small.
Proof: Straightforward. 2
Owing to the presence of the additional benets in the event of the MNE acquiring
control, a situation in which the MNE controls the DF generates higher overall surplus. The
object of Lemmas 1 and 2 is to investigate whether, by precommitting to suitable values of
 and  , the government can induce a transfer of the benets to the DSH. It would seem
that by restricting   to be greater than D, this would be achieved. However, this intuition
turns out to be false. In fact, we have shown in Lemmas 1 and 2 that in any optimal choice
of the parameters,   must be strictly less than D, since    D implies that, for any b, the
DSH gets (arbitrarily close to) D, whereas   < D implies that the DSH earns  over and
above D.
Lemmas 1 and 2 indicate that, in the context of the takeover model, some degree of
`dilution' is optimal for the domestic shareholders. Grossman and Hart (1980) have argued
9that dilution may allow the shareholders of a rm to get around a free-rider problem, which
arises as follows. Suppose that a potential acquirer can increase the value of a rm, and
each current shareholder is so small that his individual tender decision does not inuence
the outcome of a takeover bid. Clearly it is not in the interest of an individual shareholder
to tender at a price below the post-takeover value of the rm. But then the acquirer has
no incentive to take over. Shareholders can collectively overcome this problem by framing
a constitution which allows the acquirer, after takeover, to reduce the value of the rm to
those shareholders who have not tendered. This is known as dilution. Dilution can occur, for
example, when the acquirer issues shares to himself which are not matched by new equity,
or by selling some assets of the target rm at a price below their true value to another rm
owned by the acquirer, or through transfer pricing.
Setting   below D in our model (which implies that the government allows some transfer
pricing) amounts to dilution. Although there is no free-rider problem here in the sense of
Grossman and Hart since there is a single shareholder, dilution is still optimal. By setting
  below D, the government allows the DSH to obtain a capital gain on the fraction  of its
shares.
We now come to the question of optimal choice of the policy parameters  and  . The
government sets these policy parameters at time t = 0, based on the distribution F(b) from
which b will be drawn at time t = 1.
Theorem 1 (a) The optimal maximum ownership restriction  is strictly greater than 
and strictly less than one,
(b) The minimum prot requirement   is irrelevant, as long as it is strictly less than D,
(c) The probability of takeover is independent of  , D, and .
Proof: From Lemmas 1 and 2, we can restrict attention to   < D.
Dene y(b) = b +   + (D    )   P().
y(b) denotes the payo to the MNE if it acquires the DF with a bid of P(), where P()
is as given in Lemma 1. Note that the bracketed term denotes the gain to the MNE from
transfer pricing.
Let b denote the level of benets such that the MNE is indierent between acquiring and
10not acquiring. Then b must satisfy
y(b
) = 0: (2)
Also by virtue of Lemma 1, we have
(   ) P() = (1   ) 
D   (1   ) : (3)
It can be readily checked that (2) and (3) imply
: =
b + D    
b
 + D    
: (4)
Now using (2) and (3) one can check that y0(b) > 0, hence y(b)

< 0 as b

< b. Thus only an
MNE which draws b > b will bid to acquire the rm.
The expected prot for the DSH is given by
Z  b
bfP() + (1   ) gdF + F(b
)
D:














Let ~ b be the value of b which solves (5). Then ~ b satises the rst-order condition ~ b =
1 F(~ b)
f(~ b) .
Clearly  b > ~ b > 0. Part (c) of the proposition follows immediately because ~ b is independent
of  , D, and .
Part (b) follows because there is a degree of freedom in equation (4); given any   < D,
one can nd an appropriate  such that the required ~ b is obtained.
Finally, the fact that ~ b > 0, together with D >  , implies that 1 >  > , so part (a)
follows. 2
11Part (a) of theorem 1 shows that imposing ownership restrictions is always optimal.9;10
Part (b) of the proposition indicates the irrelevance of restrictions on transfer pricing. Pro-
vided that  is set optimally with respect to  , the level of post-takeover accounting prots
of the DF does not matter. In particular, the government could let   = 0,11 i.e., allow full
transfer pricing.
To focus on the issue of control, we have abstracted away from greeneld investment which
has also been increasing in recent decades. Under greeneld investment, the MNE sets up
a new plant in the host country to serve that market. This leads to increased competition
and consequently lower prices and higher consumer surplus (CS) in the host country. This
might suggest that the host country's government should always opt for greeneld FDI and
prohibit acquisitions. However, note that greeneld FDI also reduces the prots of the DSH.
In fact, compared to the case with no FDI at all, social surplus (which is often measured
as the sum of consumer surplus and the prots of DSH) might be lower under greeneld
investment.12 A full-blown analysis of optimal government policy in an environment where
acquisitions as well as greeneld investments are allowed is left for future research.13
9 It is clear from the analysis that if the MNE owns some non-controlling share of the DF's equity in
period 0, then the prots accruing to the DF as a result of the takeover would be decreasing in the MNE's
initial ownership proportion. This may explain why many countries have been imposing lower initial MNE
holdings for joint ventures.
10It might be reasonably asked why we have not allowed bargaining at time t = 1, once the benets of
control become known to the MNE. Could bargaining be better for the DSH? The answer is in the negative.
It will be seen that the payment made by the MNE to the DSH is independent of the actual realization of
the benet b. Thus the eect of the ownership restriction is to give the MNE a choice between paying the
DSH a xed amount if it enters, and not entering|a `take it or leave it' oer. This eectively gives all the
bargaining power to the DSH, so this outcome is better than any bargaining outcome.
11Owing to limited liability on the part of shareholders, negative values for post-takeover prots are not
relevant.
12Assume that the inverse demand function in the host country is P = a Q where P denotes the market
price and Q denotes aggregate output sold in the host country. Marginal cost of the DF and MNE are c

















D + CS =
3(a c)
2
8 . For c 2 (0; 1
3), D + CS is higher without greeneld investment. Hence, for a range of
parameterizations, ignoring greeneld investment and focusing on acquisition (and control) as the sole form
of FDI, as we considered in this section, is without loss of generality.
13Not allowing greeneld investments might have an additional benet in a full-blown game where acqui-
124 Prot Taxes and Alternative Objective Functions
In this section, we assume that prots are taxed at a rate  in the host country. This rate
is previously set, and not a policy variable. The tax rate in the MNE's country of origin is
less than  { for simplicity we assume that it is zero. Given the prot tax, the objective of
the domestic government is to set  and   so as to maximize objectives W2 or W3.
As a result of the tax rate , equation (2) is now replaced by
y(b
) = b
 + (1   )  + (
D    )   P = 0: (6)
where P is given by
P + (1   )(1   )  = P + (1   )(1   )
D:
Note that P so dened implies that the DSH is indierent between tendering  or  of his
shares. We assume that at this value of P he will tender .
Rearranging, we get
(   )P = (1   )[(1   )
D   (1   ) :] (7)
Consider rst the objective W2. Suppose the government sets   < D. Then, as before,
using the analogue of Lemma 1 and equation (6), we can write the government's payo (the
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Note that W 1
2 is independent of  and  , and is equal to the DSH's expected prot in the
no-tax case. Thus the cuto value b, which is implemented by the choice of , is also given
by ~ b, which solves (5). Using (6) and (7), one can easily show the optimal restriction ()
to be
() =
~ b + D    
~ b
 + ( t
 + 1   t)(D    )
:
sition is also an option for the MNE. It lowers the MNE's threat point in the acquisition game.
13It can readily be veried that  < () < 1.
Now consider   > D. Since the DF can have a maximum prot of D+b after acquisition,
the lowest value of b for which the MNE will acquire the DF is now given by
b
 =     
D;
since for b < b the DF (under MNE control) cannot show prots in excess of  .14 Also
note from Lemma 2 that, in this case, the DSH only sells a fraction  of the shares (so the















Since  must be less than unity and since~ b maximizes b[1 F(b)], it follows that W 2
2 < W 1
2.
Thus, restricting   above D is still suboptimal. It is also clear that, so long as   < D and
 is set optimally (i.e.  = ()), the level of   does not matter, as in theorem (1).
Consider now the case of the objective function W3. The government's problem is
max
;   [DSH prot] + [Tax revenue];  > 0: (8)
Note that  = 0 and  = 1 correspond, respectively, to cases W1 and W2 discussed above.





;  ) = b
[1   F(b
)] + 
D + (   1)
D + (   1)(    
D)[1   F(b
)] (9)
14We are implicitly assuming that the government cannot induce reverse transfer pricing by setting  
higher than this. In fact, it can be checked from Lemma 2 that acquisition remains protable even when  
is set higher. Since   > D, the DSH is willing to sell its shares for a price lower than D in the expectation
of a higher prot later. (However, in this case no premium accrues to the DSH.) We assume that when this
future prot requires reverse transfer pricing (e.g. it requires the MNE to price its supplied input below cost
in order to show the required prot), this promise is not credible to the DSH.Alternatively, we could use
a condition that the price P per 100% of equity which the MNE oers for the shares cannot be negative.
From Lemma 2, it will be clear that if   is suciently greater than D, the DSH would be willing to transfer
control even at some negative price per share. The conclusion which follows stands in substance under either
assumption|the one we are making simplies the algebra.
14where b is the cuto value implemented by choice of , such that the MNE will not acquire
the DF if it draws b < b. The government's problem is to maximize (9) by optimally choosing
b and  . Rather inconveniently, this maximization problem does not have a solution in the
domain   < D when  is greater than unity. In this case, the last term on the right hand
side is negative, and can be made as small as desired by setting   close to D. But the
expression does not remain valid for   = D, so the limit cannot be attained. However, for





3 = ~ b[1   F(~ b)] + 
D + (   1)
D;  > 1: (10)
where ~ b maximizes b[1 F(b)] as in (5). For   1, the last term on the RHS is non-negative,
so the optimum can be attained by setting   = 0 and maximizing the resulting expression
with respect to b.15
For    D, the ownership restriction is irrelevant, and the cuto value b of b is given
as before by b =     d. In this case, the DSH gets (1   )D irrespective of whether or









which must be maximized by optimally choosing b. Clearly this optimal choice is indepen-
dent of , and is given by b = ~ b, which solves (5).
Theorem 2 Suppose that the objective of the government is given by (8). Then
(i) for  < 1
 it is suboptimal to restrict   > D, and there is an optimal foreign ownership
15This does not contradict the result in theorem 1. The scenario here (even with  = 0) is dierent from
that in Section 2 in that we allow for a positive rate of prot tax. When  < 1, the unique optimal value
of   is 0, and the optimal value of b is smaller than ~ b.  < 1 implies that a dollar of prot earned by
the DSH contributes more to welfare than does a dollar of tax revenue. Thus setting   = 0 is optimal. In
case acquisition does take place, the government earns no tax revenue, and the DSH gets all the surplus.
However, in the event that acquisition does not take place (b < b), the gross prots of the rm are divided
between taxes and net DSH prots. Thus acquisition is desirable not only because it generates surplus b,
but also because it transfers revenue from the government to the DSH. This consideration was not present
in cases W1 and W2 (in the former because there were no taxes), thus the optimal vaue of b is lower in the
present case. Note, however, that when  = 1, the level of   is irrelevant even with a positive prot tax, so
long as   < D.
15restriction (), while
(ii) for   1
 it is optimal to set   = D + ~ b > D, and there is no optimal ownership
restriction.
Proof: See Appendix. 2
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the optimality of policy specications used to regulate the acquisition
and operation of local rms by multinational enterprises. The policy instruments consist of
limits on transfer pricing of the imported inputs and limits on the extent of foreign ownership
of domestic rms. The model presented here explicitly considers the eect of in-place policies
on the price of the rm, thus taking into account capital gains which would accrue to the
domestic owners in a rational expectations world.
If the objective of the government is to maximize the net gain of the domestic shareholder,
we found that restrictions on transfer pricing are either irrelevant or strictly suboptimal.
The conclusion carries over to the case where the objective function includes government
tax revenues in addition to DSH prots, except when the weight assigned to tax revenues is
suciently large. Interestingly, restrictions on foreign ownership turns out to be the crucial
element in any optimal policy. It may be noted that many countries uniformly impose such
requirements.
The eect of ownership restrictions is to reduce the probability of takeovers. Acquisition
occurs if the benets from integration are suciently high, and in these cases, part of the
rent is transferred to the domestic owners of the rm. This suggests that for an MNE which
does not already have units in the country, entry occurs through acquisition because the
benet of establishing the rst unit is particularly high.
16Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Let 0 be the amount of equity that the DSH sells.
Proof of (a):
Dene D
1 (0) = (1   0)  + P0, and
D
2 (0) = (1   0)D + P0,
i.e. D
1 is the DSH's prot if control is transferred (0 > ), and D
2 if control is not
transferred (0  ).
(i) Suppose P  D.
Then for 0 > 0,   < D implies that D
1 (0) < D and D
2 (0)  D. Therefore 0 = 0 is
optimal.
(ii) Suppose D < P < P().
dD
2
d0 =  D + P > 0, hence for 0  , 0 =  maximizes prot.
dD
1
d0 =    + P > 0, hence for  < 0  , 0 =  maximizes prot.
Now [D
1 ()   D
2 ()] = (1   )  + P   (1   )D   P
= [(1   )    (1   )D] + (   )P
< [(1   )    (1   )D] + (   )P()
< [(1   )    (1   )D] + [(1   )D   (1   ) ] = 0.
Hence 0 =  is optimal.
(iii) If P  P(), then it can be shown exactly as in (ii) above that  (resp. ) is the optimal
amount to sell in the case where control is not transferred (resp. is transferred), and that
D
1 ()   D
2 ()  0 according as P  P(), implying 0 =  is optimal.
Proof of (b):
It follows from (a) that in order to acquire control, the MNE must oer to buy a fraction
 >  at a price P  P(), and that at this price it will be oered exactly a fraction  of
the shares. Assuming it oers exactly a price P(), the MNE's prot at t = 1 is
M
1 () = (D    ) + b +     P()
where the rst term represents prots from transfer pricing, b is its private benet from
control,   is its share of the accounting prots of the DF, and the last term is the amount
paid for the shares.
Now, substituting the expression for P(), it can be readily checked that M
1 () is increasing
17in . Thus if the MNE bids for control at all, it will oer (;P()) and its prot will be
M
1 ().
Alternatively, the MNE may bid a pair (;P) such that  <    and D  P < P().
Then it obtains a fraction  of the shares, hence its prots are
M
2 = D   P:
It follows immediately that a price of D < P < P() is strictly inferior to P = D, and the
MNE is indierent between buying  shares at P = D and not buying any shares at all.
It can be easily checked that the same conclusion is obtained if the MNE makes an oer
(;P) where   .
The choice is therefore between acquiring control, in which case it gets M
1 (), and not




1 ()  0 ,  
b + D    
b
 + D    
  (b):
Note that  < 1 )  (b) < 1. 2
Proof of theorem 2: For arbitrary b and   < D, dene
W(b
;  ;) = W
1
3(b





)]   ~ b[1   F(~ b)] + (   1)(    
D)[1   F(b
)](12)
That is W(b;  ;) is the excess of W 1
3 with the parameters set at arbitrary values over
the maximized value of W 2
3. We need to show that for  < 1
, there exist admissible values
for b;   such that W is positive, whereas in the converse case, W is negative for all
admissible values.
Note that  < 1, and that 1   
<
 0 as 

< 1
. Consider the following cases.
Case 1:   1 The last term in (12) is non-negative since   < D. Setting b = ~ b we have
W(~ b;  ;)  (1   )~ b[1   F(~ b)] > 0:
Case 2: 1 <  < 1
 Using (10), we have
sup
b2fb; bg; <D
W = (1   )~ b[1   F(~ b)] > 0
18) 8 > 0; 9b();  () such that
W(b
();  ();) > (1   )~ b[1   F(~ b)]   
so choose 0 <  < (1   )~ b[1   F(~ b)], then W > 0.
Case 3:   1
 In this case we have
sup
b2fb; bg; <D
W = (1   )~ b[1   F(~ b)]  0
but since  > 1, by the discussion following (9) the supremum cannot be attained, which
implies that W < 0 for all admissible values of b and  .
Part (i) of the theorem follows from cases 1 and 2, and part (ii) follows from case 3. 2
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